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Intertwining personal and reward relevance: evidence from the drift diffusion model 
A.Yankouskaya, R. Bührle, E. Lugt, M.Stolte, J. Sui 
Abstract 
In their seminal paper ‘Is our self nothing but reward’, Northoff and Hayes (2011) proposed 
three models of the relationship between self and reward and opened a continuing debate about how 
these different fields can be linked. To date, none of the proposed models received strong empirical 
support. The present study tested common and distinct effects of personal relevance and reward 
values by de-componenting different stages of perceptual decision making using a drift-diffusion 
approach. We employed a recently developed associative matching paradigm where participants (N 
= 40) formed mental associations between five geometric shapes and five labels referring personal 
relevance in the personal task, or five shape-label pairings with different reward values in the reward 
task and then performed a matching task by indicating whether a displayed shape-label pairing was 
correct or incorrect. We found that common effects of personal relevance and monetary reward were 
manifested in the facilitation of behavioral performance for high personal relevance and high reward 
value as socially important signals. The differential effects between personal and monetary relevance 
reflected non-decisional time in a perceptual decision process, and task-specific prioritization of 
stimuli. Our findings support the parallel processing model (Northoff & Hayes, 2011) and suggest 
that self-specific processing occurs in parallel with high-reward processing.  Limitations and further 
directions are discussed. 
Introduction 
Studies investigating social perception have agreed that reward and self-relevance are two 
important social factors driving people’s basic behavior. A large body of research demonstrated that 
both reward and self-relevance enhance perceptual, attentional and executive control processes to 
achieve more efficient goal-directed behavior (Clithero & Rangel, 2014; Denny, Kober, Wager, & 
Ochsner, 2012; Fossati et al., 2004; Kelley et al., 2002; Rushworth, Noonan, Boorman, Walton, & 
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Behrens, 2011). Recent studies provide compelling evidence for improved behavioural performance 
in the context of perceptual decision tasks with stimuli linked to personal relevance or monetary 
gains and that the effects of high reward (versus low reward) mimic those of self1 (versus others).  
For example, similar to the self, high reward enhances matching responses to formerly neutral 
shapes (Sui, He, & Humphreys, 2012; Sui, Yankouskaya, & Humphreys, 2015; Yankouskaya, Sui, 
Moradi, Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 2017), is less affected by stimulus degradation (Sui et al., 2012) 
and facilitates decision processes (Enzi, de Greck, Prosch, Tempelmann, & Northoff, 2009). 
Furthermore, an enhanced response to reward and the self has been repeatedly observed in 
conjunction with elevated neural activations in cortical midline structures such as the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), pregenual anterior cingulate cortex (pgACC) and ventral striatum 
(D'Argembeau, 2013; Doering et al., 2012; Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; Rushworth et al., 2011; 
Schneider et al., 2008). The similarity in behavioural and neural effects of self and high reward 
raised the question to what extent these effects reflect each other (Northoff, 2016). The importance 
of this question stems from a continuing debate about whether the self reflects higher-order features 
of cognitive processes (Humphreys & Sui, 2016; Sui, 2016), basic functions of the brain’s 
spontaneous activity (Bai et al., 2016; Conway, Pothos, & Turk, 2016; Lane, Duncan, Cheng, & 
Northoff, 2016; Northoff, 2016), or the binding levels of processing (Sui & Humphreys, 2015a). 
Comparing the effects of self-relevance with the effects triggered by other basic motivational 
functions such as reward, group membership or emotions provides a way to ‘trace the trajectory of 
self’.  
Northoff and Hayes (2011) proposed three models of the relationship between the self and 
reward: (i) the integration model assuming overlap between self and reward, (ii) the segregation 
model where value assignment and self-specificity assignment are regarded as different processes 
that are regionally and temporally segregated, and (iii) the parallel processing model posits that 
different aspects of self-specific processing may occur in parallel with aspects of reward- related 
                                                 
1 Following Christoff, Cosmelli, Legrand and Thompson (2011), we define the term ‘self-relevance’ 
as a processing requiring one to evaluate or judge some feature in relation to self. The self in this 
context reflects our ability to form a mental association between self and an object and includes a 
memorial component (Gallagher, 2000). 
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processing at some levels, but assumes a complex relationship between self and reward with 
multiple interactions across the continuum. Although recent work has made progress in evaluating 
behavioural effects of self and reward (Madan, Ludvig, & Spetch, 2014; Madan,  & Spetch, 2012; 
Sui & Humphreys, 2015c; Sui, Ohrling, & Humphreys, 2016; Sui et al., 2015; Zhan et al., 2016), 
none of these models received convincing empirical support (for a review see Northoff, 2016).  This 
is, particularly, due to methodological limitations such as different experimental tasks and 
procedures being used to examine the effects of personal relevance and reward on cognitive 
processes. For example, during reward task subjects might perform a complex gambling task, where 
they could either win or lose whereas, during personal relevance blocks, subjects indicated whether a 
stimulus was of high or low relevance to them (e.g., Enzi et al., 2009).  
Humphreys and Sui (2012) introduced a robust experimental paradigm to test behavioural 
effects of self and reward using an associative matching procedure, which allows performance to be 
directly compared across the tasks. The associative matching procedure requires participants, first, to 
form mental associations between geometric shapes and labels referring personal relevance (e.g., 
circle – you, hexagon – friend, rectangle - stranger) in personal task, and between geometric shapes 
and labels referring different reward values (e.g., square - £9, diamond - £4, triangle - £1) in reward 
task. Immediately after, they perform a matching procedure by indicating whether the displayed 
shape-label pairings are correct or incorrect. A unique aspect of this design is that it triggers 
common cognitive processes underlying a mental synthesis of a neutral object and a person or 
reward value, enabling direct comparisons between the effects of personal relevance and reward on 
perceptual decision (Sui et al., 2012).  
Using the associative matching paradigm, previous studies reported two main findings of the 
effects of self-relevance and reward. First, responses to associations with high salient stimuli (e.g., 
self, high reward) were faster and more accurate compared with objects associated with others or 
low reward (Sui & Humphreys, 2015b). Biased responding to self- and high reward-associations 
occurred even when stimuli were visually degraded (Sui et al., 2012). Second, no correlation was 
observed between biased responding to self- (defined as [RTother – RTself]) and high reward- 
(defined as [RTlow reward – RThigh reward]) association indicating that self- and high reward-biases 
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may reflect different underlying origins (Sui & Humphreys, 2015c; Sui et al., 2015). The last finding 
received additional support from a study where participants had to link self and friend (high reward 
and low reward) with two different shapes and then classified a single or redundant (two) stimuli 
representing the self or the friend (high reward or low reward) (Yankouskaya et al., 2017).  In line 
with previous research, there were comparable patterns of self- and high reward-biases observed, but 
the analysis of capacity coefficient (Townsend & Eidels, 2011; Townsend & Wenger, 2004) further 
revealed that self-associations, but not high-reward associations generated mean redundancy gains 
with identical shapes and only self-associations consistently violated the independent processing 
model and produced evidence of super-capacity processing. In contrast, there was an apparent 
qualitative shift in the processing of reward-related items, where limited capacity processing was 
evident. These results point out the different architecture of processing shapes ‘tagged’ with self-
relevance and reward values (Yankouskaya et al., 2017). 
It has to be noted that when personal relevance and reward are linked to each other 
experimentally, the interplay between self- and reward-associations may occur. For example, when 
shape-label pairs (e.g., circle-you, square-friend, triangle-stranger) were linked to different reward 
values (e.g., £8, £2, £0) (Sui & Humphreys, 2015), responses to self-related pairs were less affected 
by reward associations, but high reward facilitated other personal pairs (friend and stranger) relative 
to the same personal pairs linked to low reward. The interplay between between self and reward 
processing was reported in a recent EEG-study were participants performed a head orientation 
judgment task (left/right) with face images (i.e., self, friend or stranger) presented after a cue 
stimulus (e.g., monetary reward or blank paper) (Zhan et al., 2016). The data showed facilitation 
effects of reward on self-faces at later controlled attention stages (indexed by the P3 and LPP 
components), but not at an early automatic attention stage (e.g., indexed by the N2 component).  
Although the facilitation effects indicate possible relationship between personal relevance 
and reward value, the key question about common and distinct effects of personal relevance and 
reward values on perceptual decision making is still unanswered. Answering this question will 
inform current models of the relationship between self and reward and may have important 
implications for clinical studies. For example, in understanding impaired self and reward processing 
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in Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD) (e.g., Chakraborty & Chakrabarti, 2015; Scott-Van Zeeland, 
Dapretto, Ghahremani, Poldrack & Bookheimer, 2010), social anxiety (Maresh, Allen & Coan, 2014) 
and in patients with anterior and medial cortical lesions (Farinelli, Panksepp, Gestieri, Leo, Agati, … 
Northoff, 2013). Here we directly address the question by mapping cognitive processes underlying 
responses to personal - and reward-related stimuli using signal detection and diffusion model 
approaches.  
The diffusion model approach (Ratcliff, Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2016; Voss, Nagler, & 
Lerche, 2013) assumes that perceptual decision making is based on a stochastic accumulation of 
incoming sensory information. Specifically, the difference in sensory evidence supporting two 
response alternatives (e.g., ‘correct pairing’ vs. ‘incorrect pairing’) accumulates over time to present 
an internal decision boundary, which determines the choice. This accumulation stops once enough 
evidence has been sampled, and a decision is made. By estimating a set of parameters of the 
diffusion process (such as pre-decision encoding, the rate of information accumulation, the execution 
of the selected response), this approach enables comparisons between ongoing cognitive processes 
for different conditions (Voss, Rothermund, & Voss, 2004). Previously, drift diffusion modelling 
was applied to data from a number of studies on perceptual decision making in reward processing 
(Goldfarb, Leonard, Simen, Caicedo-Nunez, & Holmes, 2014; Moustafa et al., 2015). There was no 
study, however, using the diffusion model approach to investigate the differences between the 
effects of self- and reward-associations on perceptual decision processes.  
Overview and hypotheses 
The core interest of the present study is to investigate the commonalities and differences 
between the effects of self- and reward-associated stimuli on perceptual decision making. The null 
hypothesis in our study is that there will no reliable differences between the effects of personal 
relevance and reward values on underlying perceptual decision making. Accepting the null 
hypothesis will support the integration model (Northoff & Hayes, 2011). It has to be noted that the 
effects of personal relevance and reward values can be considered at two levels: (i) the task level 
where we manipulate the relatedness of a stimulus to persons or reward incentives; (ii) the condition 
level where we assign a stimulus to a specific person or a concrete reward value. Strong support for 
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the integration model will be obtained if we observe common effects at both levels.  If personal-
relevance and reward values have differential effects on parameters of the decision process, the 
results will provide evidence for the segregation model. Alternatively, some parameters of decision 
making process may show common patterns for personal and reward tasks, but have stimulus-
specific effects within each task. Particularly, based on the results of previous studies (Sui & 
Humphreys, 2015b) we expect no effect of task (personal, reward) on accuracy and RT performance 
and no significant differences between starting point of the evidence accumulation process in each 
task. However, it is plausible to assume that personal and reward associations may differentially 
affect drift rate because they have a different exertive draw on attention. For example, it was 
demonstrated that ‘self-cued' stimuli automatically capture attention (Yankouskaya, Palmer, Stolte, 
Sui, & Humphreys, 2016), but there is no evidence for automatic reward processing.  
To test the hypotheses, we carried out an experiment where participants performed two 
separate associative matching tasks – one using stimuli associated with persons and the other one 
with stimuli associated with reward values. Previous studies employing associative matching 
procedure used two- (Sui et al., 2012; Sui et al., 2016) or three-item (Sui & Humphreys, 2015a) 
associations in each task (e.g., circle – you, square-friend, pentagon-stranger in the personal task; 
rectangle-£8, triangle-£4, diamond-£1 in reward task). It was demonstrated that participants could 
reliably distinguish between the self and others (e.g., friend and stranger) when responding to 
personal shape-label pairings and between high (e.g., £8) and low reward values (£4, £1) when 
responding to reward shape-label pairings. Although the difference between others (i.e., friend and 
stranger) or low reward values (i.e., £4 and £1) yielded weaker effects, the data from a number of 
studies consistently showed a significant linear trend across stimuli in both tasks. The trend indicates 
that either self and high reward may serve as an anchor point in decision making (e.g., Sui & 
Humphreys, 2013). If this holds, it would be interesting to test whether people use similar decision 
criteria in personal and reward tasks and whether accumulation of information for personal 
associations is similar to reward-associations.  
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To test these assumptions, we used 5-item associations in each task (self, mother, partner, 
friend, stranger in personal association task, and 9x, 7x, 5x, 3x, 1x in reward association task) which 
enables us to examine the decision-making process in each task. 
Method 
Subjects 
Forty young adults (M=20.3, SD= 2.56) (25 females) participated in the present study. All 
participants were self-identified as being in a romantic relationship. They were recruited within 
colleges and departments at the University of Oxford.  The subjects reported no neurological 
conditions and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. This experiment was approved by Central 
University of Oxford Research Ethics Committee (CUREC). All participants provided informed 
consent. 
 Apparatus, stimuli and procedure 
 
Participants performed an associative matching procedure where stimuli associated with 
personal and reward relevance were assigned to separate blocks presented in counterbalanced order. 
For simplicity, we labelled the blocks as ‘personal task’ and ‘reward task’. Ten geometric shapes 
were randomly assigned to labels representing five persons (me, partner, mother, friend, stranger) 
and five reward values (x9, x7, x5, x3, x1). An instruction for each task was displayed on the screen 
asking participants to remember five shape-label pairings (e.g., me-circle, partner-square, mother - 
vertical rectangle, friend-pentagon, stranger-horizontal oval in the personal task; x9-triangle, x7-
vertical oval, x5-diamond, x3-upside-down triangle, x1- horizontal rectangle in the reward task). An 
experimental design and example of stimuli are displayed in Figure 1. In the reward task, ‘x’ 
corresponded to a certain monetary amount on each trial (£0.01), for example, ‘x9’ was rewarded 9 
times for correct responses as much as ‘x’. Participants were aware that they would receive the total 
sum of the corresponding bonuses for correct responding in the reward task. They were not limited 
in the amount of time to memorize the associations, but in average, they spent 2-3 minutes in each 
task.  
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Fig. 1 An experimental design and example of stimuli in personal and reward tasks.  
The instruction stage was followed by a short training2 (20 practice trials) and the 
subsequent experimental stage where participants had to make an accurate and fast judgment 
whether a displayed shape-label pairing was correct (half of the trials) or incorrect. The pair either 
conformed to the written instructions given at the beginning of the experiment or it was a 
recombination of a label with a different (non-matching) shape. The presentation of shape-label pairs 
was randomised across trials. Subjects responded to a shape-label stimulus by pressing the 
corresponding key (i.e., ‘n’ and ‘m’ keys balanced across participants for responses ‘correct pairing’ 
and ‘incorrect pairing’). Feedback on accuracy (words ‘Correct!’ or ‘Incorrect!’) and overall 
response time was provided after each trial in the training. In the experimental stage, participants 
performed eight blocks (four blocks for personal task and four blocks for reward task) of 150 trials 
yielding in total 600 trials in each task (60 trials per condition; five matching and five nonmatching 
conditions). No feedback was provided during the experimental stage.  
On each trial a central fixation cross (covering 0.8° × 0.8° visual angle) appeared for 500 ms 
followed by a shape (covering 3.5° × 3.5° of visual angle)-label (covering 1.76°/ 2.52° × 1.76° of 
visual angle) stimulus for 100 ms and a blank interval (1000 ms) for participants’ response (Figure 
1). If a subject made no response during the blank interval, a feedback ‘too slow’ was appeared on 
the screen and the stimulus would be presented again by the end of the block.  
                                                 
2 A number of trials in the training stage was determined by previous studies (Sui et al., 2012) and a 
pilot study with 5 participants.  
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The experiment was run on a PC with a 22” monitor (1920 x 1080 pixels) at 60Hz, using E-
prime software (Version 2.0) to present the stimuli and record responses. 
At the end of the experimental stage, we had participants perform a modified version of a 
paper-and-pencil projective technique (Sui & Humphreys, 2015c). We asked participants to indicate 
the personal distance between two people by making two marks on a straight line (i.e., self and 
mother, self and friend, self and partner, self and stranger). The instruction was: “Please, mark two 
points on the following lines to indicate whether the two fall in a relation to each other. The first 
mark refers to the first person, and the second mark represents the second person”. There were 10 
trials per pairing (50 trials in total) presented in random order. The physical distance between the 
marks was averaged across each pairing. The relative personal distance between self and stranger 
scaled by the distance between self and mother (self and partner, self and friend) was calculated for 
each participant and served here as individual indices of the personal distance between the 
participant and others.  
Analyses 
  All data files are deposited on the Open Research data repository (insert the link here).  
Prior entering data into analyses, we removed outliers defined as RTs shorter than 150 ms 
(Ratcliff, 2015) which accounted for less than 0.4% of responses for each participant. Data from one 
participant were removed due to computer failure in the reward task, and the remaining 39 individual 
data sets were entered into four analyses. 
Accuracy and RT performance. Matched and mismatched pairs were analysed separately due 
to different responses being made in these cases. We calculated the proportion of correct responses 
for personal and reward associations and report the overall accuracy performance.  
Three analyses were performed on RT data. To obtain a general idea about the difference in 
RT performance between the task we carried out a paired sample t-test. The second analysis 
examined the effects of stimulus (personal or reward associations) in each task and addressed the 
question of whether responses to personal and reward associations generate a linear trend across the 
stimuli using one-way repeated measured ANOVAs and polynomial contrasts. In the third analysis, 
reaction time data were modelled using a mixed-effects approach. The advantage of using the 
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mixed-effect modelling here is that it accounts for inherent dependencies between stimuli due to 
repeated measures and individual variations in generating associations with personal and reward 
relevance. For example, stimulus-specific idiosyncrasies may be observed within subject’s data due 
to individual experience in relationship with close, familiar and unfamiliar people. Similarly, 
subject’s socio-economic status may affect individual’s value of the amount of the reward.  
The mixed-effect approach is based on partitioning error terms in a classical regression 
model into the usual residual error term plus a number of random effect terms accounting for 
dependencies in the data by adjusting the predicted values of the model separately for each level of 
the grouping factor (Task). We used the lme4 and nlme packages to perform the mixed-effect model 
analysis in R-programming (R Development Core Team, 2013; Baayen, Davidson & Bates, 2008).  
  In our experimental design, factor Stimulus is nested within Task factor. A fitted model 
included response time as a depended variable, fixed effects of Task and two random effect terms: 
(i) random Stimulus intercepts and (II) random intercepts and Task slopes across Subject. It has to be 
noted that both fixed effects and random variance components are of substantive theoretical interest 
here. Particularly, by taking into account the random effects of both Subject and Stimulus and 
allowing the effects to vary randomly with respect to Subject, we may expect no effects of Task. 
However, if the effects do exist, analysis of the random variance components may help to explore 
whether and how associations with personal relevance and reward values contribute these effects. 
The contribution of random effects was estimated using the Likelihood Ratio Test (Judd, 
Westfall, & Kenny, 2012). The likelihood ratio statistic is equal to two times the difference of the 
log-likelihoods of two models where one model includes a parameter of interest (fitted model), and 
the second model (null-model) does not contain the parameter of interest. Normality in the 
distribution of the residuals of final models was assessed using quantile-quantile plots.  
RT-gains.  We examined the magnitude of the facilitation effects in personal task and 
addressed the question of whether the advantage in responding to shapes associated with self, close 
and familiar people generates a linear trend. Similar, we assessed RT advantage for high reward 
values compared to low reward values.  
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Sensitivity index. Using a signal detection approach (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999; Witt, 
Taylor, Sugovic, & Wixted, 2015), we then computed the sensitivity index (d′) for each association 
within the tasks. The sensitivity index which characterized the sensory process was calculated from 
the HR (Hits for matched pairs) and FAR (False Alarms for mismatched pairs containing the same 
shape) as following: d′ = zHR – zFAR, where zHR and zFAR are the z-score transforms, based on 
the normal distribution, of the HR and FAR probabilities. Assessing the sensitivity index as a 
relatively stable property of the sensory process provides us with an initial idea of whether RT 
differences between conditions reflect differences in perceptual sensitivity to stimuli (Witt et al., 
2015).  
Drift diffusion modelling. To get a more thorough understanding of cognitive processes 
underlying the effects of personal- and reward-associations on behavioural performance, we used the 
drift diffusion modelling approach (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008) that enables statistical separation of 
different components of a speeded binary decision process. The drift diffusion model assumes that 
decisions are based on processing of information accumulated over time. This process moves 
between two boundaries, which are linked to the two possible decisional outcomes (e.g., CR- 
‘correct response’ and IR - ‘incorrect response’). Therefore, evidence supporting CR outcome drives 
the process towards boundary CR (e.g., upwards), while evidence supporting the IR decision drives 
the process towards boundary IR (e.g., downwards). As soon as one of these thresholds is reached, 
the corresponding response (e.g., pressing ‘n’ vs. ‘m’ key) will be triggered and executed. The 
components of the decision process are represented by different parameters of the model. A short 
description of the parameters is presented in Table 1 (Voss, Voss, & Lerche, 2015). Here we aim to 
examine the effects of stimuli manipulation in the personal and the reward tasks on different 
components of the decision process by comparing the parameters between tasks and conditions.  
Table 1 Parameters in the drift diffusion model  
Parameter Description 
a The width of the interval between decision thresholds; quantifies the amount of 
evidence that must accumulate before a response is initiated 
v 
 
The strength (and direction) of the systematic influence on the diffusion process.  
z The starting value of the process. If the starting point is closer to the upper threshold 
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(i.e., z > a/2), the mean RTs of the response connected to the upper threshold will be 
smaller than the mean RTs of the lower threshold.  
t0 The duration of all extra-decisional parts of the response time. This parameter sums up 
all extra-decision processes, that is pre-decision components (e.g., stimulus encoding) 
and post-decision processes (e.g., response execution). Importantly, the t0 parameter is 
conceptually independent of all processes of response selection (which are captured by 
the diffusion process)  
sz, sv, st0 Inter-trial variability for the starting value (z), drift diffusion and non-decision time 
respectively.  
 
The diffusion-model data analysis was conducted with fast-dm (Voss et al., 2015). To test 
the effects of experimental manipulations in personal task and reward tasks on parameters of the 
diffusion process, we allowed two parameters (v and t0) to vary between conditions in each task. By 
allowing the drift rates (v) to vary between conditions we expect to gain an idea of how fast 
information enters the decision process for shape-label associations in each task. On the other hand, 
it is plausible to assume that depending of individual importance of personal and reward 
associations, the strength of representations which are stored in memory may vary across conditions 
within a participant. Thus, the response execution may be facilitated or delayed due to response 
preparation or interference which would map on non-decisional time (t0). For a more robust 
estimation of the parameters, we set inter-trial-variability of drift (sv) and starting point variability 
(szr) to zero. The starting point (z) and threshold separation (a) were fixed to the same values across 
conditions within a participant. We report z/a instead of z because it can be interpreted as a measure 
of decision bias (Voss et al., 2015). Values of z/a greater than 0.5 indicate a bias toward the response 
associated with the upper boundary, whereas values less than 0.5 indicate a bias toward the response 
associated with the lower boundary. 
Our primary interest focused on matched3 trials in each task. For the present analyses, the 
diffusion model was fitted to individual reaction time distributions for five matched trials in personal 
(self, mother, partner, friend, stranger) and reward (9x, 7x, 5x, 3x, 1x) tasks. The upper (lower) 
threshold was assigned to correct (incorrect) responses.  In total, we estimated parameters for 39 
                                                 
3 Fitting the diffusion model to responses in mismatched trials is less meaningful, because different 
labels (e.g., mother, partner, friend, stranger) paired with a shape (e.g., for self) may contaminate 
accumulating evidence toward decision boundaries  
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models in each task. Each model was based on 300 responses (60 trials x 5 conditions) minus 
excluded responses, if any.  
We estimated the model fit by using the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) test. The estimation 
procedure enables us to assess the degree of correspondence between theoretical and empirical 
distributions based on T-statistics (i.e., the maximum vertical distance between the empirical RT 
distribution and the predicted time distribution) (Voss et al., 2013). A significant result (i.e., one 
below a = .05) indicates that observed data largely deviates from prediction. The model fit (KS-test) 
was computed for each participant and each condition. To estimate the overall fit of the models to 
the data, the number of significant KS tests (< .05) were entered into a binomial test with parameters 
of n (number of tests) and p () (Voss & Voss, 2007).  
Personal distance and RT-gains. Finally, we examined the relationship between the index of 
the personal distance and RT differences between conditions in the personal task. Particularly, we 
were interested in whether subjective experience of personal distance to a mother, partner and friend 
can predict the difference in RT performance between self and mother, partner and friend. Three 
separate linear regression analyses were conducted with the index of the personal distance as the 
predictor and RT difference as the dependent variable.  
Additional analysis. To quantify evidence in favour of the null-hypothesis (H0), we 
calculated a Bayes factor (BF) for all crucial contrasts using the JZS-approach (Rouder, Speckman, 
Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009; Rouder, Speckman, Morey, & Province, 2012). The JZS Bayes Factor 
which provides the odds ratio for the null/alternative hypotheses (BF01) given the data is based on 
the combination of the Cauchy on effect size and the Jeffreys prior on variance (Rouder et al., 2009). 
The JZS Bayes factor was computed with version 0.9.8 of the BayesFactor package for R using 
ttest.tstat function4 (Morey, Rouder, Pratte, & Speckman, 2011). Here we report the raw (BF01) to 
communicate evidence for the H0. When appropriate, the inverse BF was calculated to provide 
evidence for the alternative (H1) hypothesis and reported as (inverse BF).  
                                                 
4 As the ttest.tstat function returns the log(e) Bayes factor against the null hypothesis, we applied the 
conversion formula (1/exp(BF)) to obtain the raw values for BF.  
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Results 
Accuracy performance 
Proportions of correct and incorrect responses in personal and reward tasks are displayed in 
Figure 2. Participants were accurate in both tasks (M = 0.86, SD =0.03; M = 0.87, SD = 0.02, in 
personal and reward task respectively). There were no significant differences in accuracy between 
personal and reward tasks for matched (t(38) = 0.63, p = .53, dz = 0, BF01 = 6.61) and mismatched 
pairs (t(38) = 0.45, p = .65, dz = 0, BF01 = 7.26).  
Previous studies reported a linear trend in accuracy performance in personal task using 
three-item associations (Sui, Ohrling, & Humphreys, 2016). Here we tested whether a linear trend is 
also held for five-item associations. Polynomial contrasts showed that in both tasks the proportion of 
correct responses for matched pairs decreased linearly with decreasing personal relevance (F(1, 38) 
= 36.28, MSE = 0.352, p < 0.001) and reward value (F(1, 38) = 20.35, MSE = 0.17, p < 0.001) 
(Figure 2). The polynomial contrasts for mismatched trials in both tasks did not show a linear trend 
(F(1, 38) = 1.87, p = .19; F(1, 38) = 0.93, p = .79).  
 
Fig. 2 A proportion of correct responses for matched and mismatched pairs in personal and reward 
tasks. Error bars represents +/- SEM   
RT performance 
To gain a general idea about RT performance, we first examined the difference in RT 
between personal and reward tasks using paired sample t-tests. The results showed that for both 
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matched and mismatched pairs responses in the personal task were slower compared to the reward 
task ((t(38) = 7.89, p < .001, dz = 1.26; t(38) = 8.54, p < .001, dz = 1.36) (Figure 3, A).   
 
Fig. 3 Mean reaction times (RT) for matched and mismatched pairs in personal (A) and reward (B) 
tasks. Error bars represents +/- SEM 
We then examined the effects of Stimulus in each task and assessed whether responses to 
personal and reward associations generate a linear trend across the stimuli using one-way repeated 
measured ANOVAs. In total, four separate ANOVAs were performed (for matched and mismatched 
pairs in personal and reward tasks).  
Personal task. There was a main effect5 of Stimulus (self, mother, partner, friend, stranger) 
for matched pairs (F(4, 152) = 23.18, MS = 29190,79, p < .001). A polynomial contrast showed a 
strong linear trend in increasing RT across the continuum self-mother-partner-friend-stranger 
(polynomial contrast F(1, 38) = 72.43, MSE = 110,616, p < 0.0001). Post Hoc analysis with 
Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons indicated no significant differences between RT for 
self, mother and partner (t(38) = 1.7, p = .9, dz = 0.27, BF01 = 2.05; t(38) = 2.7, p = .085, dz = 0.43, 
BF01 = 0.31; t(38) = 1.5, p = 1.0, dz = 0.24, BF01 = 2.75). It has to be noted that an estimated Bayes 
factor (null/alternative) for the self-partner comparison indicates that the difference between these 
conditions was 3.23 times more likely to occur under the alternative hypothesis.  
Responses to shapes associated with friend and stranger for matched pairs were slower 
compared to shapes associated with self, mother and partner (t(38) = 7.6, p < .001, dz = 1.21; t(38) = 
6.5, p < .001, dz = 1.04; t(38) = 7.2, p < .001, dz = 1.15; t(38) = 5.9, p < .001, dz = 0.94; t(38) = 4.3, 
                                                 
5 Sphericity is assumed unless otherwise specified.  
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p = .001, dz = 0.69; t(38) = 4.6, p < .001, dz = 0.74). Thus, these results provide further support for a 
linear trend across the stimuli in personal task. 
For mismatched pairs, there was a main effect of Stimulus (F(3.05, 115.9) = 26.44, MSE = 
9913,79, p < 0.001 (degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of 
sphericity)). A polynomial contrast showed a significant linear trend in increasing response time in 
the continuum self-mother-partner-friend-stranger (F(1, 38) = 37.39, MSE = 22954,43, p < 0.001). 
Post Hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections showed that responses to mismatched 
pairs containing shapes associated with self and mother were significantly faster compared to the rest 
of the stimuli (all ps < .05) (Supplementary Material, Table S1). The difference between self and 
mother (t(38) = 2.3, p = .26, dz = 0.36, BF01 = 0.71) also did not reach a significance level. A Bayes 
factor provides insufficient evidence for either the null and the alternative hypotheses.  
Reward task. A repeated measures ANOVA showed a main effect of Stimulus (x9, x7, x5, 
x3, x1) for matched pairs (F(1, 38) = 18.77, MSE = 17852,31, p < 0.001) and a strong quadratic 
trend (a polynomial contrast, F(1, 38) = 70.11, MSE = 61088,64, p < 0.0001). Post Hoc pairwise 
comparisons with Bonferroni corrections revealed no significant differences between x7, x5 and x3 
reward values (t(38) = 2.4, p = .18, dz = 0.38, BF01 = 0.58; t(38) =0 .92, p = 1.0, dz = 0.15, BF01 = 
5.32; t(38) = 1.3, p = 1.0, dz = 0.21, BF01 = 3.57). The difference between the polar ends of the 
reward continuum (i.e., between x9 and x1) was non-significant (t(38) = 2.2, p = .18, dz = 0.35, BF01 
= 0.86). The Bayes factor was inconclusive for the difference between x7 and x3 and x9 and x1 
reward values. 
Responses to either x9 and x1 reward values were significantly faster compared to all 
intermediate reward values (x7, x5, x3) (t(38) = 5.8, p < .001, dz = 0.93; t(38) = 6.4, p < .001, dz = 
1.02; t(38) = 6.8, p < .001, dz = 1.08; t(38) = 3.2, p = .001, dz = 0.51; t(38) = 4.2,  p < .001, dz = 
0.67; t(38) = 4.8, p < .001, dz = 0.77). 
For mismatched trials, there was a significant main effect of Stimulus (F(4, 152) = 6.39, 
MSE = 2152,85, p < .001). A polynomial contrast showed that the data fit either a linear and 
quadratic trends (F(1, 38) = 9.88, MSE = 3568,11, p = .003; F(1, 38) = 9.79, MSE = 3595,74, p = 
.003, respectively). Post Hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that responses to a shape associated 
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with the lowest reward value (i.e., x1) were significantly slower compared to the rest of stimuli 
(t(38) = 3.8,  p = .004, dz = 0.61; t(38) = 3.2,  p = .02, dz = 0.51; t(38) = 3.9,  p = .005, dz = 0.62; 
t(38) = 3.2,  p = .03, dz = 0.51). No significant differences were found in pairwise comparisons 
between x9, x7, x5 and x3 rewards (all ps > .05) (Supplementary Material, Table S2). 
The mixed-effect modeling. Visual inspection of residual Q-Q plots did not reveal any 
obvious deviations from homoscedasticity or normality. Fitting a model with fixed (Task) and 
random effects (Stimulus intercepts and by-Subject adjustment to Task intercepts and slopes) for 
matched pairs indicates that removing the random effects from the model significantly decreases the 
goodness of fit as indicated by likelihood ratio tests (Table 2).  
 
Table 2 Mixed-effects modelling of correct responses in matched pairs (χ2 - Chi-Square value, SD – 
variability expressed as a standard deviation for Variance component, CI – 95% confidence interval* 
(min=2.5%, max=97.5%), SE – standard error, t- maximum likelihood t-test for fixed effects, df – 
degrees of freedom using Satterthwaite approximations, p-value for the fixed effects and model fit) 
Effect Variance 
 
SD 
[95%CI] 
χ2 Estimate 
[95%CI] 
SE 
 
t 
 
df 
 
p 
 
Random 
effects 
        
Stimulus 
(Intercept) 
574.8 23.97 
[16.6; 31.7] 
103.5     < .0001 
Task: Subject 
 
269.4 16.41 
[14.4; 37.6] 
34.9     < .0001 
Residual 1104.8 33.24 
[30.8; 36.1] 
      
Fixed effects         
Intercept    648.77 
[628.9; 668.7] 
10.2 63.29 21.5 < .0001 
Task    24.64 
[8.4; 40.8] 
 8.2 3.6 9.8 <.01 
*95% CI was computed based on approximate asymptotic estimates using the likelihood profile 
method with R package lme4  
 
Effect (contrast) coding was used to code the fixed factor (.5 personal task; -.5 reward task) 
and the difference between the levels of Task was computed as the product of these codes. This 
analysis revealed a significant effect of Task such that responses were faster for reward associations 
compared to personal associations (Table 2).  
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To explore the random effect of Stimulus (nested within Task) we computed and plotted 
the conditional mode for each stimulus (i.e., the difference between the average predicted response 
for fixed-effect values and the response predicted for a particular stimulus). The results presented as 
a dotplot of prediction intervals for the random effects of Stimulus for matched pairs (Fig 4, a) 
indicate differential contribution of personal and reward associations to the random effect. 
Specifically, all personal associations excluding associations with partner showed random effects 
distinguishable from zero. In contrast, prediction intervals on the random effects of x1, x7 and 
marginally x5 reward associations overlap zero (Figure 4a).  
 
Fig. 4 Estimate (black dots) and 95% prediction intervals (horizontal lines) on the random effects of 
Stimulus for (a) matched pairs and (b) mismatched pairs in personal and reward task.  
 
Fitting a model with fixed (Task) and random effects (Stimulus intercepts and by-Subject 
adjustment to Task intercepts and slopes) for mismatched pairs showed that, similar to matched 
pairs, removing the random effects from the model significantly decreases the model fit (Table 3).  
Table 3 Mixed-effects model results for correct responses in mismatched pairs (χ2 - Chi-Square 
value, SD – variability expressed as a standard deviation for Variance component, CI – 95% 
confidence interval* (min=2.5%, max=97.5%), SE – standard error, t- maximum likelihood t-test for 
fixed effects, df – degrees of freedom using Satterthwaite approximations, p-value for the fixed 
effects) 
Effect Variance 
 
SD 
[95%CI] 
χ2 Estimate 
[95%CI] 
SE 
 
t 
 
df 
 
p 
 
Random 
effects 
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Stimulus 
(Intercept) 
145.6 12.07 
[7.3; 19.8] 
83.2     < .0001 
Task: Subject 
 
470.4 21.69 
[17.1; 27.7] 
513.1     < .0001 
Residual 355.9 18.87 
[17.4; 20.4] 
      
Fixed effects         
Intercept    706.3 
[690.9; 721.6] 
7.8 90.3 42.9 < .0001 
Task    30.79 
[20.4; 41.1] 
 5.3 5.86 22.1 <.0001 
*95% CI was computed based on approximate asymptotic estimates using the likelihood profile 
method with R package lme4  
 
In contrast to matched pairs, analysis of prediction intervals for the random effects of 
Stimulus in mismatched pairs showed that only one reward association (x1) contributes to the 
random effects of Stimulus. Prediction intervals for three (self, mother and friend) personal 
associations did not overlap the intercept (Fig 4, b).  
RT-gains (facilitation effects) 
To examine the facilitation effects of personal relevance and monetary reward values on RT 
performance, we calculated the magnitude of RT advantage (RT-gain) for self, mother, partner and 
friend relative to stranger (and for 9x, 7x, 5x, 3x reward values relative to 1x) for each participant. 
By assessing the relative differences at the individual level, we measured relative sizes of the 
differential effects of personal relevance and monetary reward values disentangling the individual 
variability in RTs.  RT-gains were calculated as following: self (RTstranger – RTself), mother 
(RTstranger – RTmother), partner (RTstranger – RTpartner), friend (RTstranger – RT friend). 
Similarly, we defined four RT-gains in reward task - 9x (RT1x – RT9x), 7x (RT1x – RT7x), 5x 
(RT1x – RT5x), 3x (RT1x – RT3x). RT-gains were computed for matched and mismatched pairs 
(Figure 5).  
One-sample t-tests with bias corrected and accelerated (BCa) bootstrapping procedure 
indicated that in matched pairs, the magnitude of RT-gains for self, mother, partner and x9 reward 
was significantly greater than zero (t(38) = 6.56, p < .001, dz = 0.89, MD6 = 61.4 msec, BCa 95% CI 
[42.1, 80.9]; BF01 = 6.27e-06; t(38) = 5.93, p < .001, dz = 0.95, MD = 48.9 msec, BCa 95% CI [31.5, 
                                                 
6 MD – mean difference 
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65.9], BF01 = 4.17e-05; t(38) = 4.62, p < .001, dz = 0.74, MD = 36.4 msec, BCa 95% CI [20.9, 52.3], 
BF01 = 0.002; t(38) = 2.45, p = .02, dz = 0.039, MD = 18.7 msec, BCa 95% CI [4.49, 32.2], BF01 = 
0.52, respectively). Importantly, a Bayes factor provided strong evidence for the alternative 
hypothesis for self, mother and partner (the inverse ratio (H1/H0) >100), however, the evidence for 
9x reward value was inconclusive.  
A significant RT-gain for self and mother was found even in mismatched trials (t(38) = 3.91, 
p < .001, MD = 19.3 msec, BCa 95% CI [10.3, 28.6], dz = 0.63, BF01 = 0.01; t(38) = 5.9, p < .001, 
MD = 28.7 msec, BCa 95% CI [18.9, 38.6], dz = 0.95, BF01 = 4.5e-05). But this was not the case for 
any reward values (the magnitude of RT-gains was significantly below zero (Figure 5) (a 
comprehensive list of statistics is presented in Supplementary Material, Table S3). 
 
Fig. 5 RT facilitation effects (RT-gains) in the personal and the reward task. The error bars represent 
SEM +/- 1. The negative values indicate no RT gain. The asterisks showed whether the RT gains 
were significantly above 0 (One-sample t-test against 0).  
 
To examine the effects of shape category on the magnitude of RT-gain for matched pairs in 
personal task, a repeated measures ANOVA was carried out. There was a main effect of shape 
category (F(3,114) = 32.15, MSE = 24235,52, p < .001) and a strong linear trend (F(1,38) = 56.42, 
MSE = 67838,53, p < .001). Post Hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections indicated 
that the magnitude of RT-gains for self and mother was significantly greater than for partner and 
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friend (t(38) = 4.3, p = .001, dz = 0.69, BF01 =0.0051; t(38) = 5.4, p < .001, dz = 0.86, BF01 =0.0002; 
t(38) = 6.7, p < .001, dz = 1.07, BF01 = 4.12e-06; t(38) = 9.2, p < .001, dz = 1.47, BF01 = 2.9e-09, 
respectively). No significant differences in RT-gains were found between self and mother (t(38) = 
2.31, p = .16, dz = 0.31), and partner and friend (t(38) = 2.34, p = .15, dz = 0.35). However, the 
Bayes factor provides inconclusive evidence for both comparisons (BF01 =0.69 and BF01 =0.65, 
respectively).  
Finally, we tested whether the magnitude of RT-gain for self can predict the magnitude of 
RT-gain for high reward. The results showed that the RT-gain for self cannot reliably predict the 
RT-gain for x9 reward (B = -0.013, SE = 0.15, t(38) = 0.26, p = .79; dz = 0.041, BF01 = 7.75).  
Perceptual sensitivity 
Perceptual sensitivity (d′) in personal task did not differ significantly from reward task (t(38) 
= 0.39, p = .69, dz = 0.072, BF01 = 7.44). To examine the effect of Stimulus on d′, perceptual 
sensitivity indices were computed for each condition per participant and submitted to a repeated 
measures ANOVA for each task separately.  
In personal task, there was a main effect of Stimulus (self, mother, partner, friend, stranger) 
(F(4, 152) = 6.23, p < .001) and a strong linear trend in decreasing sensitivity in the continuum self-
mother-partner-friend-stranger (F(1,38) = 17.92, p < .001) (Figure 6). Post Hoc pairwise 
comparisons with Bonferroni corrections showed that sensitivity to self and mother was higher 
compared to partner (t(38) = 2.9, p = .057, dz = 0.46, BF01 = 0.19; t(38) = 3.4, p = .015, dz = 0.54, 
BF01 = 0.057) and stranger (t(38) = 3.6, p = .01, dz = 0.58, BF01 = 0.034; t(38) = 3.9, p = .003, dz = 
0.62, BF01 = 0.015). Although the difference between self and partner did not reach significance 
level (p = .057), the Bayes factor provides evidence in support the H1 hypothesis (the inverse Bayes 
factor = 5.26). No significant differences were found between the rest of personal associations (see 
for details in Supplementary Material, Table S4).  
In the reward task, there was a main effect of Stimulus (x9, x7, x5, x 3, x1) (F(4,152) = 3.55, 
p = .008). There was also a linear trend in decreasing sensitivity with decreasing reward incentives 
(F(1,38) = 7.15, p = .011). Post Hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections showed that 
sensitivity to x9 reward was significantly higher compared to x3 reward (t(38) = 3.31, p = .021, BF01 
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= 0.074). No other significant terms were found here (all ps > .05). However, the Bayes factors 
provided evidence for the null hypothesis for differences in sensitivity between x9 and x7 (BF01 = 
7.30), x7 and x1 (BF01 = 3.22), x5 and x3 (BF01 = 5.04) and x5 and x1 (BF01 = 7.06). There was no 
much evidence for the effects between x9 and x5 (BF01 = 0.62), x9 and x1 (BF01 = 2.15), x7 and x5 
(BF01 = 1.92), x7 and x3 (BF01 = 0.29), and x3 and x1 (BF01 = 2.79).  
 
Fig. 6 Mean perceptual sensitivity index (d′) for shapes associated with persons and reward values. 
The error bars represent SEM +/- 1. 
To test whether changes in perceptual sensitivity in the personal task (defined as [d′stranger - 
d′self]) could predict changes in perceptual sensitivity in the reward task (defined as [d′x1- d′x9]), a 
regression analysis was carried out. The results showed that the changes in perceptual sensitivity in 
the personal task could not reliably predict the changes in perceptual sensitivity in the reward task (B 
= -0.057, SE = 0.18, t(38) = 0.32, p = .75, dz = 0.05, BF01 = 7.63).  
Drift-diffusion computational results 
Decision bias (z/a). The decision bias parameter (or the relative starting point) was 
significantly higher for the reward task (M = 0.58, SD = 0.09) compared to the personal task (M = 
0.53, SD = 0.06) (t(38) = 2.72, p = .01, dz = 0.44, BF01 = 0.29 (the inverse BF = 3.44)). 
Drift rates (v). The difference in drift rates between the reward task (M = 2.82, SD = 1.33) 
and the personal task (M = 2.58, SD = 1.06) did not reach significance (t(38) = 2.01, p = .052,  dz = 
0.32, BF01 = 1.22). Because the Bayes factor was inconclusive here and p-value fell at the board of 
significance, we performed an additional analysis using an equivalence testing approach and the 
‘two-one-sided t-tests’ (Lakens, 2017). In the ‘two-one-sided t-tests’ (TOST), an upper (ΔU) and 
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lower (–ΔL) equivalence bounds are specified based on the smallest effect size of interest (e.g., a 
positive or negative difference of Cohen’s d = 0.3). Two composite null hypotheses are tested: H01: 
Δ ≤ –ΔL and H02: Δ ≥ ΔU. When both these one-sided tests can be statistically rejected, one can 
conclude that –ΔL < Δ < ΔU (i.e., the observed effect falls within the equivalence bounds and is 
close enough to zero to be practically equivalent (Lakens, 2017). The TOST procedure indicated that 
the observed effect size was not significantly within the equivalence bonds of -0.3 and 0.3 scale 
points (or in Cohen’s dz: -0.16 and 0.16), t(38) = -0.19, p = .42.  
To examine the effect of Stimulus on the drift rates in each task, two repeated measures 
ANOVAs were carried out.  
In the personal task, there was a main effect of Stimulus (F(4, 152) = 17.00, MSE= 13.074, 
p < .001) (Figure 7, A) and a strong linear trend (a polynomial contrast, F(1, 38) = 47.83, p < .001). 
Post Hoc pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni corrections showed that drift rates for self and 
mother were significantly larger compared to the rest of stimuli (all ps <.05). No other terms were 
significant here (all ps >.05) (detailed results are presented in Supplementary Material, Table S5).  
In the reward task, there was a main effect of Stimulus (F(4, 152) = 6.73, MSE= 6.85, p < 
.001) (Figure 7, A) and a strong quadratic trend (a polynomial contrast, F(1, 38) = 29.43, p < .001). 
Post Hoc pairwise tests showed that drift rates for shapes associated with x9 reward were 
significantly larger compared to all intermediate reward values (all ps <.05), but not to x1 reward 
(t(38) = 2.38, p = .22, dz = 0.38, BF01 = 0.61). No other significant terms were found here (all ps 
<.05) (see for details in Supplementary Material, Table S6). 
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Fig. 7 Mean estimates of (A) drift rates (v) and (B) non-decision time (t0) in personal and reward 
tasks. The error bars represent SEM +/- 1. 
Non-decision time (t0). The non-decisional component was significantly longer in personal 
task (M = 0.52, SD = 0.04) compared to reward task (M = 0.49, SD = 0.06) (t(38) = 3.65, p = .001, 
dz = 0.58, BF01 = 0.03).  
In the personal task, (F(4, 152) = 15.35, MSE = .012, p < 0.001) (Figure 7, B) the non-
decisional time was significantly longer for partner and stranger compared to self, mother and friend 
(all ps <.05). No other pairwise comparisons reached significance level here (see Supplementary 
Material, Table S7). 
In the reward task, there was a main effect of Stimulus (F(4, 152) = 10.12, MSE = .007, p < 
0.001) and a strong quadratic trend (a polynomial contrast, F(1, 38) = 28.59, p < .001). Both x9 and 
x1 reward values showed significantly shorted non-decision time compared to intermediate rewards 
(Figure 7, B; Supplementary Material, Table S8). The difference between x1 and x7 rewards did not 
reach significance level, and a Bayes factor provided weak evidence for either the null and the 
alternative hypotheses (t(38) = 2.45, p = .19, dz = 0.39, BF01 = 0.52). The differences in non-decision 
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time between intermediate reward values were non-significant (all ps <.05). There was also no 
significant difference between x9 and x1 rewards (t(38) = 1.54, p = .14, dz = 0.24) and the Bayes 
factor was inconclusive here ( BF01 = 2.59). 
We assessed goodness of fit (Voss & Voss, 2007; Voss et al., 2015) for 39 individual 
models in each task. In the personal task, the model showed bad fit to the data for two participants 
(KS, p=.006, p = .024). In the reward task, the model fit test was significant for four participants (p = 
.012, p = .003, p = .048, p = .004). A binomial test indicated that the proportion of models with good 
fit to the data (0.948, [95% CI [0.83, 0.99]) in the personal task and (0.0.897, [95% CI [0.76, 0.97]) 
in the reward task was significantly higher then the proportion of models with bad fit (ps < .001, 2-
sided). These results suggest that the individual models describe the individual RT distributions well.  
 
The relationship between subjective experience of the personal distance and RT difference 
Individual indices of the personal distance between the participant and others (calculated as 
indices of the relative personal distance between self and stranger scaled by the distance between 
self and mother (self and partner, self and friend)) were entered in to a repeated measures ANOVA 
to examine the effect of person (mother, partner, friend) on the relative personal distance. 
There was a main effect of person (F(2, 76) = 19.92, MSE = 12,956, p < 0.001) (Figure 8) 
suggesting larger personal distance to friend compared to mother (t(38) = 4.86, p < 0.001, dz = 0.78, 
BF01 = 0.001) and partner (t(38) = 4.16, p < 0.001, dz = 0.66, BF01 = 0.007). The difference between 
the distance to mother and to partner did not rich significance level (t(38) = 2.48, p = 0.061, dz = 
0.39), and the Bayes factor was inconclusive here  (BF01 = 0.49).  
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Fig. 8 Personal distance indices represent relative distance from self to mother (calculated as [self – 
stranger]/[self-mother]), partner ([self – stranger]/[self-partner]) and friend (self-stranger]/[self-
partner]). Error bars represent +/-SEM. The asterisks indicate significant differences between 
conditions (adjusted for multiple comparisons using Bonferroni correction). 
Two simple linear regressions were carried out to test whether the indices of the personal 
distance between self and mother and mother and partner could predict the difference in RT between 
them.  The results suggested that a significant proportion of the total variation in the RT difference 
between self and mother was predicted by the index of the personal distance between self and 
mother (Table 5, Figure 8). The coefficient of determination (R2) indicated that approximately 32% 
and 37% of the variation in the RT difference was predicted by the index of the personal distance to 
mother and partner respectively. According to Cohen’s effect size (Cohen, 1988), this refers to 
substantial effect. Similar results were found for self-partner relationship (Table 4, Figure 8). In 
contrast, the index of the personal distance between self and friend could not reliably predict the 
difference in RT between self and friend (BF01 = 1.57) (Table 4). 
Table 4 Results of linear regression analyses between indices of the personal distance and RT 
differences 
Independent 
variable 
Dependent 
variable 
ANOVA R2  p 
F(1, 38) MSE p 
self-mother 
personal 
distance 
RT difference 
between self and 
mother 
17.41 .811 < 0.001 0.32 0.56 < 0.001 
self-partner 
personal 
distance 
RT difference 
between self and 
partner 
19.6 2.270 < 0.001 0.37 0.61 < 0.001 
self-friend 
personal 
distance 
RT difference 
between self and 
friend 
.87 1.68 =0.35 0.151 -0.003 =0.35 
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Fig. 8 A linear regression plot between the index of personal distance and RT difference for self-
mother (A) and self-partner (B) relationship. 
  
General Discussion 
  The experiment provides evidence for common and distinct effects of personal relevance 
and reward values on perceptual decision process. The evidence is summarised in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 Common and distinct effects of personal relevance and reward values on perceptual 
decision process in speeded two-alternative choice matching task. BFINC indicates that the Bayes 
factor provides inconclusive evidence for the result. 
Personal relevance Reward values 
Common effects 
Facilitation effects of personal relevance/reward value on accuracy performance (accuracy rates increase 
linearly with increasing personal relevance/reward value in matched trials). No effect of personal 
relevance/reward value on accuracy in mismatched trials. 
 
Facilitation effects of personal relevance/reward value on RT performance in matched and mismatched 
trials. 
No effect of Task (personal, reward) on perceptual sensitivity (d′). A trend in decreasing perceptual 
sensitivity with decreasing personal relevance/reward incentives. 
No effect of Task on the the average rate of information uptake in decision process (drift rates, v) 
(BFINC). 
Distinct effects 
Slower responses to shape-person associations 
compared to shape-reward associations 
  
Faster responses to shape-reward associations 
compared to shape-person associations  
RT increases linearly with increasing personal 
relevance of stimuli. This effect is strong and 
holds for matched and mismatched pairings. 
 
All personal associations excluding associations 
U-shape relationship between reward value and 
RT. This effect holds for matching pairings only. 
 
 
Prediction intervals on the random effects of x1, x7 
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with partner showed random effects 
distinguishable from zero in matched pairs 
  
and marginally x5 reward associations overlap zero 
in matched pairs 
RT-gains for self, mother and partner in matched 
and mismatched trials 
Greater RT-gains for self and mother (compared 
to partner and friend).  
No difference in RT-gains between self and 
mother (BFINC) and between partner and friend 
(BFINC) 
RT gain for the x9 reward value only (BFINC) in 
matched trials. No RT-gain in mismatched trials 
 
 Response bias is more liberal compared to personal 
task 
Drift rates in decision process increase linearly 
with increasing personal relevance associated with 
stimuli (across the continuum: stranger-friend-
partner-mother-self) 
 
Drift rates in decision process conform to a  
U-shape where the highest speed reflects the 
highest and the lowest reward values (across the 
continuum (x9-x7-x5-x3-x1) reward)  
 
Longer non-decisional time in perceptual decision 
processes compared to shape-reward associations. 
Shapes associated with partner and stranger 
showed the longest non-decisional times. 
Shorter non-decisional time in perceptual decision 
processes compared to shape-person associations. 
The changes in non-decision time conform to an 
inverted U-shape where the shortest time reflects 
the highest and the lowest reward values 
 
The decision bias parameter (z/a) is lower  
 
Associations with self serve as an anchor point in 
the personal relevance continuum (self-mother-
partner-friend-stranger) 
The decision bias parameter (z/a) is higher 
 
No evidence that associations with the highest 
reward value serve as an anchor point in the reward 
relevance continuum (x9-x7-x5-x3-x1) 
 
Common effects of personal relevance and reward values 
Our finding that personal relevance and reward modulate response speed and accuracy adds 
to the mounting evidence of self- and reward- prioritization effects reported in cognitive research 
(Dambacher & Hubner, 2013; Karsilar, Simen, Papadakis, & Balci, 2014; Madan & Spetch, 2012; 
Sui & Humphreys, 2015b, 2015c; Sui et al., 2015). More importantly, this finding confirms previous 
results that linking neutral objects with personal relevance and reward values enhances perceptual 
matching (Sui et al., 2012). For example, the current study’s findings are similar to results in Sui, et 
al., (2012) who reported faster responding for self and high reward associations, and suggested no 
qualitative differences between the two effects on behavioural performance.  
The common effects of personal relevance and reward values here were also evident in 
perceptual sensitivity data. There was no difference in sensitivity between the tasks. Furthermore, 
sensitivity index for shapes associated with high personal relevance (self and mother) and reward 
value (9x) was significantly larger across conditions in each task. Since all stimuli in our study were 
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of high contrast, we suggest that these changes in d′ imply stronger representations and/or activation 
of stored representation for personally and reward important associations. As a result, more robust 
representations change perceptual processing of the items in a bottom-up fashion generating a 
stronger perceptual signal (Wildegger, Riddoch, & Humphreys, 2015). Importantly, the changes in 
sensitivity for self-association did not relate to changes in sensitivity for high reward (9x) indicating 
qualitative differences in their representations.  
Thus, our data supports the finding that the effects of prioritizing personal and reward-
related information mimic each other, engendering similar performance on the tasks (Northoff & 
Hayes, 2011; Sui et al., 2012). The question here is how this similarity arises? 
The similarity between the effects of personal relevance and reward values may imply 
common cognitive and neural mechanisms governing the effects. Northoff and colleagues proposed 
that cortical and subcortical structures associated with self and reward processing are mediated by 
resting state activity (Northoff, 2016), which predicts the degree of reward-related activity (Duncan 
et al., 2013) and self-related activity (Lane et al., 2016). Although this account has an important 
application in understanding how different brain structures interact to consolidate high cognitive 
functions (including reward and self-referential), it does not shed light on the differential effects of 
personal relevance and reward values. Furthermore, there is evidence that the similarity between the 
effects is not unique. For example, ‘tagging’ a neutral shape with emotional information (e.g., 
positive emotion vs. neutral emotion) (Stolte, Humphreys, Yankouskaya, & Sui, 2017) or with team 
membership relevance (e.g., in-group vs. out-group) (Moradi, Sui, Hewstone, & Humphreys, 2015) 
results in behavioural patterns very similar to those observed in the personal and reward tasks in the 
current study. Moreover, self-, reward- and in-group biases showed similar modulatory effects on 
perception by increasing processing efficiency during information processing (Yankouskaya et al., 
2017). The evidence points to more generic mechanisms underlying the effects of social biases. 
Recent progress has been made toward exploring neurobiological (Groppe et al., 2013) and 
neurocognitive accounts (Humphreys & Sui, 2016). Alternatively, ‘tagging’ a neutral object with 
socially related information may trigger activation of the salience network which coordinates 
behavioural responses to prioritize the most important signals (Medford & Critchley, 2010). 
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However, it is still largely unknown whether the biases occur as multiple modalities of the same 
cognitive processes, and how they relate to each other in the brain.  
Distinct effects of personal relevance and reward values 
Relative to personal associations, responses to shapes associated with reward were 
significantly faster. This was not due to changes in perceptual sensitivity and, therefore, it is unlikely 
that enhanced responding in reward task occurs at early perceptual level. These findings indicate that 
the difference in RT between the tasks may reflect longer non-decisional component or/and stimulus 
properties in each task. Indeed, the drift-diffusion analysis provides strong support for the 
assumption that the difference between processing of personal and reward associations reflects 
longer non-decisional time in personal task. Studies employing the drift-diffusion approach suggest 
that longer duration of the non-decisional process during perceptual categorization engages 
additional cognitive resources (e.g., attention networks, working memory capacity, assessing the 
semantic meaning of a stimulus) that cause slower encoding or response execution (Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 2008). The shapes ‘tagged’ with personal relevance have ‘richer’ representations 
compared to shapes ‘tagged’ with reward values because it reflects the content associated with the 
meaning of the ‘tag’. Previous studies using the perceptual matching procedure with tree-item 
personal associations and three-items reward associations reported no significant differences in 
response time between personal and reward tasks (Sui et al., 2012; Sui & Humphreys, 2015b; Sui et 
al., 2016). In our study, we used five-items associations in each task that exerts higher cognitive 
demands on working memory. As a result, retrieving information from memory about personal 
associations may require additional time compared to information about reward associations.  
Importantly, the effect of Task was preserved even when we took into account by-subject 
and by-stimulus variability in the data. The goodness of fit of the full model which included all 
random effects significantly decreased when one of the random effects was removed. This finding 
suggests that the Task factor has a systematic and predictable influence on our data and provides 
strong evidence against the assumption that ‘our self is nothing but reward’ (Northoff & Hayes, 
2011).  Note that the experimental design, procedures and instructions to the participants were 
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identical in the personal and reward tasks and therefore the effects of task cannot be attributed to 
methodological issues.  
Exploring the random effect of stimulus revealed that shapes associated with self and mother 
reliably contribute to random effects. Assuming that the self serves as an anchor point in the 
continuum of personal relevance, it is not surprising that associations with others do not show a non-
systematic influence on response times. The plausibility of this assumption is supported by the fact 
that this effect of self-associations is observed in matched and mismatched trials. The finding that 
both self and mother showed idiosyncratic influence on the data may reflect the intention of young 
adults to be independent of parenteral influence on one hand but closeness and attachment on the 
other hand. If associations with the highest reward value would serve as an anchor point, we should 
expect to see similar effects for stimuli in reward task. However, our data do not support this 
assumption. 
We predicted that response speed in both tasks should linearly decrease from shapes 
associated with a higher value (e.g., self and 9x reward) to lower value (e.g., stranger, £1). In 
contrast to our hypothesis, we found a strong linear trend in personal, but not in reward task where 
the difference between the highest and the lowest reward values was diminished. This trend was also 
evident in drift rates and non-decisional time measures. Previous studies reported biased memory for 
the highest and the lowest outcomes associated with reward (Klingberg, 2010; Madan & Spetch, 
2012) and more recent research linked the memory bias for reward with decision making (Madan et 
al., 2014; Wimmer & Buchel, 2016). For example, Madan et al. (2014) argued that the memory bias 
from the past experience results in overweighting the largest gains and largest losses, leading people 
to seek for relative gains rather than relative losses. Furthermore, in a task where monetary reward 
anticipation was linked to incidental objects, neural patterns related to reward experiences were re-
expressed on later exposure to stimuli and reactivation strongly correlated with the behavioral 
performance (Wimmer & Buchel, 2016). In contrast, personal relevance is considered as a system 
where ‘the self’ is prima facie relatively to others (Abraham, 2013; Sui, 2016; Sui & Humphreys, 
2015a) and memory bias increases with increasing personal relevance to self (Cunningham, Turk, 
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Macdonald, & Neil Macrae, 2008; Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley, 2004; Turk et 
al., 2013). 
Earlier research reported a greater facilitation effect (RT-gain) in the personal task compared 
to the reward task (Sui & Humphreys, 2015c; Sui et al., 2015) . It was suggested that self-
associations uniquely enhance the binding of information at both perceptual and conceptual levels 
while high-reward-associations led to gains at a conceptual level; but these stimuli had weaker 
processing capacity. Although our data showed similar results, we must be cautious in the 
interpretation of these findings. The magnitude of RT-gains in reward task may be limited by 
relatively small differences in reward values (i.e., £8, £6, £4, £2). Particularly, in our study, only the 
difference between 9x and 1x values (£8) generated significant RT-gains, whereas smaller amount 
(£6, £4, £2) failed to generate any RT-gain.  
We did not find evidence for the relationship between RT-gains for self and high-reward 
value (9x). Sui and Humphreys (2015c) argued that the lack of correlation between these values 
implied separate origin of self and reward biases that operate as stable, trait-like behaviour. Our 
findings support this interpretation, however, individual differences in past experience with reward 
values may add a great variability to the data.  
Although our data support the explanation of slower RT in performing a personal task, the 
question about the strength of personal vs reward representations calls for further research. For 
example, a recent study using an associative matching procedure found that even extended learning 
undertaken to equate memory to various identity-based associations, did not eliminate the effects of 
self-prioritization, and thus, leaving the question open as to whether the differences between self and 
others are cognitive or perceptual in nature (Reuther & Chakravarthi, 2016). If, presumably, the 
facilitation effects of self and high reward values here arises from potential memory differences 
introduced during the formation of associations, we should find no difference in the drift rates, but 
larger non-decision time in performing the personal task than in the reward task. Although 
inferential statistics in our study support this assumption, the Bayes factor does not provide enough 
evidence for the null hypothesis in the drift rates difference between the task. Furthermore, the result 
of equivalence testing does not support the absence of the effect. Therefore, it is unlikely that the 
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facilitation effects of self and high reward emerges as a result of memory differences only. 
Manipulating low properties of the stimuli in each task and examining their effects on the parameters 
of diffusion process may help to separate perceptual from cognitive processes. 
The relationship between personal distance and RT-gains 
We employed a projective technique aiming to elicit subjective projections from self to 
others and assess an individual’s feelings of personal distance to close and familiar people. The data 
indicated that participants placed themselves closer to mother and partner, and the degree of their 
remoteness to them predicted the magnitude of RT-gains (i.e. RT advantage for mother and partner 
compared to a stranger). Moreover, responses to shapes associated with mother and partner were 
significantly faster compared to friend – the results that were more evident in faster drift rates and 
shorter non-decision time. These findings suggest that a closer relationship with a person, compared 
to a more distant relationship, results in stronger representations about attributes associated with the 
individual and facilitates perceptual decision making. 
Interestingly, although a large body of research emphasizes a significant role of friends in 
social, personal and academic life in young adults (Collins & Laursen, 2004), our data indicate a 
larger personal distance to a friend (compared to mother and partner) that showed no systematic 
relationship with the facilitation in RT performance. This finding is in line with studies suggesting 
that when emerging young adults are involved in a romantic relationship, the importance of the role 
of friends in their happiness is less pronounced or not pronounced at all (Demir & Özdemir, 2010; 
Lucas, Dyrenforth, Vohs, & Finkel, 2006; Whisman, Sheldon, & Goering, 2000). 
The main reason for using the projective technique here was to bridge personal projections 
to others and RT biases in personal perception. We suggest that the perceptual matching procedure 
may have an important application in interpersonal research by informing and supporting qualitative 
methods.  
 
Conclusion 
Personal relevance and monetary reward generate common and differential effects on 
perceptual decision making. The common effects are manifested in the facilitation of behavioural 
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performance for high personal relevance and high reward value as socially important signals. The 
differential effects reflect non-decisional time, and task-specific prioritization of stimuli. Our 
findings support the parallel processing model (Northoff & Hayes, 2011) and suggest that self-
specific processing occurs in parallel with high-reward processing.  
Limitations and directions for further research 
The present study focused on one type of reward (monetary).  Considering that other types 
of reward (e.g., facial attractiveness, social approval) may have a different impact on individual 
experience, it is important to examine whether the relationship between different types of reward and 
self-relevance yields the same characteristics. By empirically testing the fields of self and reward we 
will gain a better understanding of how each concept emerges. 
We do not exclude the possibility that personal and reward relevance are liable for 
interactions at higher cognitive level where the interactions may be triggered by different factors or 
linked to each other experimentally. Exploring key factors triggering the interactions is an important 
area of the research in social cognitive science that requires developing a new methodological 
approach. 
Finally, this is the first study that attempted to highlight commonalities and differences of 
the effects of personal and reward relevance on perceptual decision making. We hope that the results 
reported here will provide a strong starting-point for further research using the drift-diffusion 
modelling.  
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